Husserlian Ecology by Smith, Barry
Husserlian Ecology 
Barry Smith (Buffalo) 
phismith@acsu.buffalo.edu 
The riddle of representation: two humans, a monkey, and a robot are looking at a piece 
of cheese; what is common to the representational processes in their visual systems? 
Answer: The cheese, of course.1 
1 The Ride on Lake Constance 
If mind is a creature of adaptation, then our standard theories of intentionality and of 
mental representation are in need of considerable revision. For such theories, deriving 
under Cartesian inspiration from the work of Brentano, Husserl and their followers, are 
context.· free. They conceive the subject of mental experience in isolation from any 
surrounding physico-biological environment. 
Husserl sought in his later writings to find room for the surrounding world of human 
practical experience, and a similar expansion of concerns can be detected also in the 
writings of other later phenomenologists such as Heidegger, and Sartre, and 
Merleau-Ponty. But in none of these authors do we find sustained attempts to grapple 
with the. intervolvements of the world of human thought, feeling and action with the . 
environment of human behavior as this is described by physics and biology. 
The tradition of philosophizing initiated by Brentano included also however a group of 
holistically inclined thinkers forming what is commonly referred to as the 'Berlin School' 
of Gestalt psychology. The ·members of this school, and most especially Max 
Wertheimer, Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Ko:ffka, and Kurt Lewin, sought to understand the 
relations between acts and objects as parts or moments of a larger relation of 
engagement between subjects and objects in a common physical and biological 
environment. They embraced, in other words, what one might call an ecological 
approach to psychological phenomena, Ko:ffka and Lewin in their turn influenced two 
American psychologists J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker, both of whom (independently) 
conceived their work under the banner of 'ecological psychology.' It is against this 
background that the term 'Husserlian ecology' is to be understood in what follows. 
Brentano and his early disciples were still working under the influence of immanentistic 
or representationalist philosophies.2 External objects and external environments they 
conceived as a matter of appearance (sometimes of 'projection' or 'construction' or 
'constitution') and they saw themselves as facing the task of deriving proofs, Cartesian 
style, for the existence of an external reality from the data of immanent experience. The 
Gestalt psychologists, in contrast, had no qualms in accepting the reality of the world 
1 From: Shimon Edelman, "The World of Shapes as its Own Representation," http://eris.wisdom. 
weizmann.ac.il/~edelman/Magrittei. . . 
2 Immanentistic philosophies conceive reality as being confined entirely to the realm of experience or 
consciousness. On immanentism in the Brentano school see my Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of 
Franz Brentano (1994), especially chapters 2 and 4. 
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described in physical theories.· and they were indeed among the first to investigate the 
relations between mental experiences and associated processes in the brain. They still, 
however, when turning to the external environment of human behavior and perception 
saw the latter as something ·like a manifest image constructed by the human subject. 
Hence they ·were left with the· task - which we might think of as an externalized 
counterpart of the . mind-body problem - of explaining the relation between. this 
constructed environment and the world of physics. 
To see the nature of this problem, it will be useful to quote the passage from Koftka's 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology in which a fateful distinction between the 
psychological (or 'behavioral') and physical (or 'geographic') environments is introduced: 
On a winter evening amidst a driving snowstorm a man on horseback arrived atan inn, 
happy to have reached shelter after hours of riding over the wind-swept plain on which 
the blanket of snow had covered all paths and landmarks. The landlord who came to the 
?oor vi:we~ the str~ger with surprise :ind asked him whence he came. The man pointed 
m the dtrect10n straight away from the inn, whereupon the landlord, in a tone of awe and 
wonder, said: 'Do you know that you have ridden across the Lake of Constance?' At 
which the rider dropped stone dead at his feet. 
2 The Problem of the 'Two Worlds' 
In whatenvironment, Koftka asks, did the behavior of the stranger take place? 'The Lake 
of Constance. Certainly [ ... and it is] interesting for the geographer that this behaviour 
took place in this particular locality. But not for the psychologist as the student of 
behaviour.' The latter, Koftka insists, will have to say that there is a second sense to the 
word 'environment,' according to which 'our horseman did not ride across the lake at all 
but ac~o~s an ordinary snow-swept plain. His behaviour was a riding-over-a-plain, but 
not a ridmg-over-a-lake.' (Koftka 1935, pp. 27f.) 
How, then, are we to understand the relationship between the physical and the 
psychological environment? The tale of the ride across Lake Constance tells us that we 
cannot concei_ve. these two environments as identical in every case. If we say that they 
are always distmct (and thus embrace a 'two-world' hypothesis), then we gain the 
adv~t~ge of a un_iform domai.n for psy~hological science, but we face the problem of. ~xplammg how this psychological domam (and our psychological life) might ever come 
mto c.ontact _with .the domain of ~hysics. Perhaps we can solve this latter problem by 
assertmg an identity of psychological and geographic environment in those standard or 
de~ault cases where there is a match between experience and objects, and affirm the 
existence of a special psychological environment only in cases of mismatch of the sort 
described ?Y Koftka: This, ho~ever, would imply a peculiar ontological heterogeneity of 
psychological experience (which from the perspective of the experiencing subject would 
yet appear homogeneous). For it would imply that we would bounce back and forth 
between genuine interaction with physical reality and quasi-solipsistic concern with our 
own psychological creations, in a way whiCh would imply also a corresponding disunity 
of the domain of psychological science. 
Like their Brentanist predecessors, the Berlin Gestaltists embraced the first of these two 
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alternatives. They were consequently not able to come to a coher~nt account _of the 
lationship between the psychological environment (and psychologically experienced ~~·ects) and the transcendent world of physical things. This is true even of the most so~histicated theories of the psychological environment sue~ as tho~e advanc~d by Kurt 
Lewin and by Meinong's student Fritz Heider: the psyc~ologic~l environment i.s for them, 
too, something that is dependent upon the ego (so~ethmg that is present even m dre~s: 
Heider 1959a). And it is true, also, of mamstrerun psychology today, which 
characteristically adopts the standpoint of 'methodological solipsism' (Fodor 1 ?SO). The 
issue of the relationship between psychological and physical ph~nomena is her~by 
bracketed forever in order to ensure an ontologically umform d?I?am for psychol~g~cal 
science within which both trlle and false beliefs and both veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual phenomena can enjoy equal civil rights. 
3 Husserl's Phenomenology and Its Biological Problems 
Fodor argues that if a genuine ('nomological') science of psycholog~ is to be rossible at 
all, then a hypothesis of representationalism must be adopted acc.ordmg to whi~h mental 
processes are to bejunderstood n terms of relations that organisms bear to ~m~an.ent 
mental representations. The science. of phenomenology, as Husserl tells us m simtlar 
vein, has as its subject-matter: 
' 
all the species of acts which the researcher of any kind of s~ience acc.omrl~s~es, all the 
species of meanings which in s~ch acts medi.ate . t~~ relation t~ objectivities, all t~e 
modes of appearances in which these objectivities enter. mto · t~e r~search:r s 
consciousness, all the modes of thoughtful grasping and noetlcal quahfi~atlon ~h1ch 
emerge therewith - all these become . in phen~menology theoretical ~bJects. 
Phenomenology does not investigate the objects mvestigated by the resear.cher m other 
sciences; on the contrary, it investigates the total system of. possible act.s of 
consciousness, of possible appearances and meanings related to precisely those objects. 
(Hua IV, p. 312) . . . . . . . . . · 
Phenomenology is, then, the methodologically sohpsistic mvestigation of acts m ~eneral, 
and of their meanings and directedness towards objects; and it ought, so conceived, to 
remain neutral in relation to metaphysical questions pertaining to the status of the 
external objects of different types towards which our acts are pu~atively directed. But 
Husserl does not remain neutral in this respect. If. we examme the structure of 
consciousness, he tells us, 'then we see that all of nature, with space, time, causality, etc., 
is completely dissolved into a web of imman:~t motivations.' .C~ua IV, p. 226) The 
stream of consciousness is a procession of positmgs. These positmgs are regulated ~y 
strict rules. But there is, as Husserl sees things, nothingelse, nothing beyond a certam 
harmonious play of immanent motivations among such acts.1 
One notorious problem with all such representationalist views is the diffi~ulty t~ey face. 
in accounting for the existence of harmony among the different "".orld~ which arise when 
'world' is relativized to your or my subjective appearances. Even if, with Husserl, we ~ee 
'world' as relativizedto all human beings,~ there still remains the problem of accountmg 
3 See also Crisis, p. 152, Hua Vil, p. 155. · . · 
4 Hua IV, pp. 376f. Crisis, pp. 179, p. 220 (HuaVI, pp. 182f., 223f.). 
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for the interaction between. this human world and the worlds of other biological species 
as also between all of these and the world of physical science.J. Husserl's attempts to, 
resolve these problems, above all in the Cartesian Meditations, are brilliant indeed. 
Unfortunately, they remain rooted in considerations of the world as this is given in 
human experience and fall far. short of what would be needed if the ontology of this 
intersubjective human world is to leave room for the possibility of interaction on the 
physical and biological plane. 
4 Scheler's Doctrine of the Milieu 
A similar quandary is faced also by Sclieler, whose theory of the 'milieu' of practical life 
is of incidental interest in virtue of its influence on Heidegger's philosophizing. The 
things (Sachen) which are relevant to our acting, Scheler tells us, those things belonging 
to the milieu of our everyday practical life, 
have of course not the slightest to do either with Kant's 'thing in itself or with the objects 
conceived by science (through the supposition of which science 'explains' natural facts). 
The sun of the milieu of human beings is not the sun of astronomy. The meat that is 
stolen, bought, ·or what have you, is not a sum of cells . and tissues with the 
chemicophysical processes which take place within them. The sun of the milieu is 
different at the North Pole, in moderate zones, and at the equator, and its beams are felt 
as different beams. (Scheler 1954, p.158f., Eng. trans., p. 139) 
The problem with this passage is clear. As schoolboys with microscopes know, meat that 
is stolen and bought does most certainly possess cells and tissues which undergo 
chemicophysical properties.· It simply cannot be the case that the things in our practical, 
commonsensical environment have 'not the slightest' to do with the objects conceived by 
science. 
Electrical and magnetic currents, Scheler wants to hold, may affect me 'objectively,' but 
they do not belong to my milieu, which comprehends 'only that . which I effectively 
experience.' But is it really possible to mark out a 'world' of what is effectively 
experienced without at the same time letting in all manner of cells, tissues, fields, 
currents, and the chemicophysical properties relating thereto? 
One option pursued by Scheler is to see milieu-things as being in some sense 
intermediate between persons and the 'objective' reality that is studied by physics, as 
belonging to an intermediate realm 'lying betWeen our perceptual content and its objects 
on the one hand and those objectively thought objects on the other.'§. In the absence, 
however, of a satisfactory account of the relationship between such milieu-things and 
their physical counterparts, Scheler comes teeteringly close to the sort of idealist 
position which in other contexts he strenuously abjured. 
An alternative view would conceive the milieu as in some· sense a product of selection. 
5 In a review of Ideas II, Alfred Schutz reports that Husserl held back from publishing this work 
precisely because of problems such as this. See Schutz 1953, p. 17 of reprint. 
6 Scheler 1954, p. 159, Eng. trans. p. 140; compare also: What is otherwise called milieu is, in its 
temporal extension, tradition, i.e. history as living and effective in us' (op. cit., p. 166n., Eng. trans. p. 
147n.). 
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As Scheler himself writes at one point, milieu-objects are 'cut out .of the totality of 
world-facts' on the basis of the value-directions immanent to our acting as embodied 
beings. My milieu-world is rich or poor, on this account, in proportion to the fullness of 
the value repertoire which drives my actions.1 If what is selected is a part of the whole 
with which we begin, however, then all of its parts must be included in the selection also 
(this follows from the transitivity of the relation of part to whole). On a selectionist view, 
therefore, we are forced to embrace the conclusion that milieu-things do after all include 
all those cells and molecules and all of those chemico-physical processes which Scheler 
had sought to exclude from the environment of human action. 
The milieu, for Scheler, is something holistic: it is not the sum of things I perceive or 
take an interest in or pay attention to; rather I can be intentionally related only to what 
already belongs to my milieu. The milieu is a fund of objects, a fund of all of that of 
which we have the ability to take account in our practical day-to-day dealings with the 
world. The milieu can include not only food, utensils, people, buildings, but also the 
laws which I obey or disobey, the value-qualities which make things attractive or 
repulsive, and other features outside the realm of material things. Thus a given territory 
presents different milieux to one who recognizes the authorities which prevail within it, 
to a criminal, .and to one who is an enem~ in time of war. The· sam: fore~t is· likewise a 
different milieu to a forester, a hunter, a hiker, as also to a deer or a hzard. -
5 Uexkiill's Constructivist Biology 
Scheler's ontology of milieux recalls the constructivist biology of his contemporary 
Jakob von Uexkiill. Every animal, Uexkiill held,· is the ·creator of its own 'external 
reality', of an environment that is constructed by the organism to meet its own needs. 
The 'first principle' of Uexkilll's theory of environments of Umweltlehre reads as 
follows: 
all animals, from the simplest to the most complex, are fitted into their unique worlds 
with equal completeness. A simple world corresponds to a simple animal, a 
well-articulated world to,a complex one. (Uexkiill 1957, p. 10) 
On the one hand, these created realities are seen as separated off from each other in the 
manner of Leibnizian monads (Uexkiill himself refers to them as 'soap bubbles'9). On the 
other hand, the separate monads are held to be capable of interacting - though the 
explanations we are .offered of this interaction by Uexkiill and his followers are, to say 
the least, difficult to understand. The eye, we are told in one such explanation, 'throws' 
the picture that is produced on its retina out of itself into the visual space surrounding 
the animal. 'If the eye did not have this capacity, the dragonfly would not be able to 
7 Op. cit., p. 176, Eng. trans. p. 157. 
8 Op. cit., p. 161f., Eng. trans. p. 142f. · . 
9 And also as pipes: If one represents the environment of an animal at a given moment as a circle, then 
one can add each successive moment as a new environment-circle. In this way one would obtain a 
pipe which would correspond in its length to the life of the animal. This pipe will be formed on all 
sides with characters which one can think of as b.eing built up along and around the life's journey of 
the animal. This life's journey is thus similar to an environment-tunnel that is closed at both ends. The 
type of character which can appear in this environment-tunnel is fixed from the start, so that one can 
designate its breadth and its richness as predestined. But also the temporal length of the tunnel has a 
predetermined extent, which cannot be exceeded. (Uexknll 1928, p. 70) 
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catch a midge in flight. ... Sounds, smells, tastes, and touch are all transposed out of the 
body and into the subjective space of the animal.' (Jennings 1909, p. 333) 
Uexkiill is reported to have arrived at this projectivist doctrine when, on looking up at a 
beech tree in the Heidelberg woods, he came to the realization that: 
This is not a beech tree, but rather my beech tree, something that I, with my sensations, 
have constructed in all its details. Everything that I see, hear, smell or feel are not 
qualities that exclusively belong to the beech, but rather are characteristics of my sense 
· organs that I project outside of myself. (Schmidt 1980, p. 10, cited in Harrington 1996, p. 
41) 
As Uexkiill formulated the matte~ in his Theoretical Biology (1928, p. 2): 'All reality is 
subjective appearance - this must serve as the fundamental insight of biology, too.' 
The Kantian flavor of Uexkiill's thinking becomes especially clear in a letter to Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain of 1923, on the opposition between what Uexkiill calls the 
'intuitive space' or Anschauungsraum of the animal environment and the 'space of 
representations' (the Vorstellungsraum) of science. The latter, Uexkiill holds, forfeits any 
claim to reality. 'Intuitive space alone is real.'lQ 
We are indeed capable of building a space of representations, in which the suns and stars 
move at incredible distances and in inconceivable time. But this space of representations 
is just a watering-down of our intuitive space, that we gain by allowing several 
important elements of this intuitive space to fall away.11 
Uexkiill felt some hesitation in proclaiming this position, fearing (rightly) that he would 
either be misunderstood or considered mad. But nonetheless, he insisted, 'it remains a 
fact: "Epur non si move." I do not move around the sun, but rather the sun rises and sets 
in my arch of the sky. It is always another sun, always a new space in which it moves.'11 
And in further Kantian vein: 'Space owes its existence to the inner organization of the 
human subject, who clothes the sense qualities in spatial form.' (Uexkiill 1928, p. 4) Or 
again: 
In the eye of the naive person only the one world of appearances is visible, which, 
surrounded by space and time, is full of sounding, smelling, coloured things. Scientific 
research seeks to influence this naive world view from two opposing sides. Physical 
theory seeks to convince the naive person that the world he sees is full of subjective 
illusions, and that the one real world is much poorer, since it consists merely in an 
immense and eternal swirling dance of atoms unfurling itself in purely causal fashion. 
Biological theory, in contrast, seeks to draw to the attention of the naive person the fact 
that he sees much too little, and that the real world is much richer than he suspects 
because there is spread out around every living thing its own world of appearance, which 
is like his world in its basic traits but which nonetheless manifests so· many variations 
10 Harrington 1996, p. 46. 'The world of the physicist counts for the biologist only as a conceptual 
world [nur als eine gedachte Welt], which corresponds to no reality but which is to be assessed as an 
aid valuable for computation.' (Uexkiill 1928, p. 61) 
11 Cited in Harrington 1996, p. 46. 
12 Cited in Harrington 1996, p. 47. Translation amended. 
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that he could devote. his whole life to the study of these worlds without there ever being 
an end in sight .... And when once we have made a beginning in showing in regard to a 
few animals what environments surround them like solid but invisible glass houses, then 
we will soon be able to people the world around us with numberless other shimmering 
worlds, which will intensify the riches of our world a further thousandfoJd. In this way 
biology offers to the naive man an unlimited enrichment of his world, while the physicist 
makes of him a beggar. (Uexkiill 1928, p. 62) 
6 Ecological Realism 
Uexkiill's expostulations are colorful indeed. But they do not even begin to answer the 
obvious objections to his monadological project when it comes to giving an account of 
the interaction between organisms of different species (a problem which for Uexkiill 
himself, who rejected the theory of evolution, was not of pressing importance). · 
With the work of Gibson and Barker in the 1960s, however, we meet a new and more 
consequential phase in the treatment of this problem, a phase in which the external 
environment is at last given its due. To a much greater degree than is manifest in even 
the most radical Gestaltist writings, Gibson and Barker emphasize the fact that normal 
psychological experience is to be understood not in terms of a succession of relations 
between acts on the one hand and objects in some special 'realm,' but rather in terms of a · 
topological nesting, whereby the sentient organism is housed or situated, within a 
surrounding environment of which it serves as interior boundary . .u Its perceptions and 
actions are then mere partial moments, dependent features of · ·the total 
subject-environment relation, and are capable of being properly understood ·only as 
occurring within this wider surrounding framework. At the same time the environment is 
itself to be conceived as something that falls within the realm of physics. 
In perception, as in action, . from the Gibson-Barker point of view, we are embrangled 
with the very things themselves in the surrounding world, and not, for example, with 
'sense data' or 'representations' (or 'noemata' in Husserlian terminology). Perception is 
not a matter of the processing of sensations. Rather, it is part of that direct linkage 
between the perceiving organism and its environment which grows out of the fact that, 
in its active looking, touching, tasting, feeling, the organism as purposeful creature is 
bound up with those very objects ~ the ripened fruit, the crumpled shirt, the empty glass, 
the broken spear - which are relevant to its life and to its tasks of the moment. 
Gibson and Barker thus embrace a radically externalistic view of mind and action. We 
have not a Cartesian mind or soul, with its interior theater of 'contents' or 
'representations' or 'beliefs and desires' and the consequent problem of explaining how 
this mind or soul and its psychological environment can succeed, via intentionality, in 
grasping objects external to itself. Rather, we have a perceiving, acting organism, whose 
perceptions and actions are always already inextricably intertwingled with the parts and 
moments, the things and surfaces, of its external environment. 
13 On the formal ontology of this organism-environment relation, and on its Aristotelian roots, see 
Smith and Varzi 1999. 
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7 Roger Barker and the Theory of Physical-Behavioral Units 
Now much of this is of course in keeping with what we read in phenomenological 
descriptions of the life world, the world of human projects, of the ready-to-hand, in 
Husserl, Scheler, or Heidegger, as also in Sartre or Merleau-Ponty (both of whom were 
influenced by Lewin and the other Gestaltists). Thus as Husserl tells us in Ideas II, the 
common-sense world is a world in which people work, converse, judge, evaluate; a 
world of animals, tables, clothes, food; of sweet and bitter, red and green, hot and cold. 
It is above all a world of things which we put to use for various practical purposes, 
things which exist always in situ, which is to say: in an environment of other real things. 
In addition to things, this common-sense world comprehends also the media (for 
example air, smoke) in which we move (see Heider 1959b). Barker now goes on to point 
out that there are, within this extended array of things and media, ·certain discriminable 
areas of organization which cross-cut each other on a number of distinct dimensions. 
The world is organized not only into separate things or bodies, but also into overlapping 
personal, social and institutional zones or contexts - Barkerian counterparts of Scheler's 
milieux - within which human beings figure as participants. It is then not as if we have 
persons on one side and thingly contexts on the other, with a gulf between them that is 
bridged via intentionality. Rather, Barker insists, persons themselves, and things in the 
spatial environment, are both equally caught up within ·entities of a new, over-arching 
type, which he calls behavior settings or physical-behavioral units, entities which serve 
as the successive environments of persons and groups of persons as they go about their 
business from day to day. 
The examples of physical-behavioral units favored by Barker - who was one of Lewin's 
first assistants at the Iowa Child Welfare Station - are: Wendy's Friday afternoon class, 
Jim's meeting with his teacher, your Thursday lunch, Frank's.early morning swim. Such 
physical-behavioral units may repeat themselves (may exist in many copies). They 
are common phenomenal entities, and they are natural units in no way imposed by an 
investigator. To laymen they are· as objective as rivers and forests - they are parts of the 
objective environment that are experienced directly as rain and sandy beaches are 
experienced. (Barker '1968, p. 11, emphasis added) 
Such physical-behavioral units are of inestimable importance for an understanding of 
human cognition and action since. almost all human behavior occurs within them. All 
biographies are ordered in terms of them. All trials, all theatrical performances, all 
religious rituals, are composed out of behavior settings. Even our journeys from site to 
site, and our loungings in daydream mode between quests, even the contexts in which 
we reflect scientifically on problems of ecological psychology or carry out experiments 
in psychology laboratories, are recognizable as physical-behavioral units in Barker's 
terms. Even our more or less unsuccessful attempts to engage in standard activities can 
be understood for what they are only in terms of an independent prevalence .of 
physical-behavioral units of the corresponding, full-fledged type - for it is only in 
relation to the latter that our attempts are determined as attempts and. our successes 
distinguished from our failures. 
Psychological factors are at work in determining which of the available repertoire of 
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behavior settings we are in fact occupying (in determining which selection from 
biophysical reality is our behavior setting of the moment). But such factors, trivially, do 
not in every case operate in transparent fashion. That is, we may (like the rider on Lake 
Constance) be mistaken in our beliefs about the behavior setting we are1inhabiting. Such 
errors do not, contrary to the views of phenomenologists and methodological solipsists, 
generate special objects of their own. 
8 Prehistory of Environment Settings 
Serious investigations of environmental settings in the history of philosophy are sorely 
lacking. The theory of the life world set forth by Husserl in the Crisis is a first, informal 
approximation to an ontological theory of the requisite sort. But Husserl, too, stops short 
.· of any full realist commitment to what he calls the 'surrounding· environment,' and the 
relation of th~ latter to physical things in space is hardly clarified in this work. 
The neglect of environmental settings in the literature of philosophy turns first of all on 
the tendency among philosophers to prefer simplified ontologies - often, indeed, to 
embrace one or other form of ontological monism - where environmental settings 
transcend the bourtdaries between familiar ontological categories in ·radical fashion. 
Even those philosophers with the ambition to come to grips with the realm of common 
sense have shown a tendency to adopt philosophies whiCh reduce this realm "' on the 
pattern of the doctrine of 'logical constructions' - to objects of a suitably monistic flavor. 
The Wittgensteinian conception of the common-sense world in terms of 'language 
games' is an improvement on monistic theories. Unfortunately, however, it puts the cart 
before the horse. This is first of all because language, too, is a phenomenon which can 
be understood only within the framework of an ontological theory of environmental 
settings - where language gets used such usage itself is under all normal circumstances 
embedded within physical-behavioral units of one or other familiar sort (conversation, 
argument, warning, instruction, and so on). But it is also, and more importantly, because 
to seek. an account of our human common-sense reality in terms of language, aS some· 
Wittgensteinians have been wont to do, is to attempt to explain the whole in terms of one 
relatively late-developed part. Thus it is to place obstacles in the path of accounting for 
those many features of human behavior which are shared also by non-human animals. 
The neglect of environmental settings turns also on the dominance through the ages of 
foundationalist ideas in epistemology: for environmental settings - my evening soup, 
your Tuesday swim, the 5 o'clock train to Long Island - belong par excellence to the 
realm of mere 'appearance' in Plato's sense. Hence, erroneously, it has been concluded 
either that such objects are not amenable to rigorous treatment, whether philosophical or 
scientific, or that the given objects do not exist at all. 
9 Ontological Properties of Environmental settings 
Each physical-behavioral unit has two sorts of components: human beings behaving in 
certain ways (lecturing, sitting, listening, eating), and non-psychological objects with 
which behavior is transacted (keyboards, levers, scalpels, etc.). Each physical-behavioral 
unit has a boundary which separates an organized internal foreground pattern from an 
external background running on behind it. Each physical-behavioral unit is circumjacent 
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to its components, which means that the former surrounds (encloses, encompasses) the 
latter without a break: the pupils and equipment are in the class; the shop opens at 8 a.m. 
and closes at 6 p.m. The pertinent enclosing portion of reality may not be set apart 
physically from its neighbors. The line, or zone, of demarcation may be determined 
psychologically. (Consider, for example, the question whether some given action of the 
groom within the church is or is not a part of that physical-behavioral unit which is his 
wedding.) The significance of the resultant demarcated portion of reality, too, is a 
psychological matter. But the resultant demarcated portion exists as part of reality 
nonetheless. Environmental settings are thus in some ways analogous to geopolitical 
objects such as Poland or Dade County: such objects, too, are the products of more or 
less arbitrary demarcation on the part of human beings - they are 'fiat' or gerrymandered 
objects; but they exist as parts--of physical reality nonetheless.H 
Physical-behavioral units are characteristically self-regulating, and are such as to guide 
their components to characteristic states and to maintain those states within limited 
ranges in face of disturbances.12 Slight modifications within given dimensions of the 
unit can be sustained without detriment to its continued existence as a unit of this type, 
but the total behavior making up the unit - for example a Rotary Club meeting - cannot 
be . greatly changed without its being destroyed. The meeting must contain an 
introduction; there must be a speech, there must be listening and discussion. Within the 
meeting, there are the subparts: chairman, speaker, discussant, audience (as within the 
sentence there are the subparts: subject, verb, noun, rising inflection, and so on). 
For Gibson, reality as a whole is a complex hierarchy of such inter-nested levels of parts 
and sub~parts: molecules are nested within cells, cells are nested within leaves, leaves 
are nested within trees, trees are nested within forests, forests are nested within Special 
Federal Forest Protection Zones, and so on;.l.Q Each type of organism is then tuned in its 
perception and action to objects on a specific level within this complex hierarchy - to 
objects ('affordances') which are the environmental correlates of adapted traits on the 
side of the organism and which together form what Gibson calls the organism's 
'ecological niche'.11 A niche is that into which an animal fits (as a hand fits into a 
well-fittin~ glove). The niche is that in relation to which the animal is habituated in its 
behavior.L It embraces not only things of different sorts, but also shapes, textures, 
boundaries (surfaces, edges), all of which are organized in such a way as to enjoy 
affordance-character for the animal in question in the sense that they are relevant to its·· 
survival. The given features motivate the organism; they are such as to intrude upon its 
life, to stimulate the organism in a range of different ways.12 
14 See my "On Drawing Lines on a Map" (Smith l 995a). 
15 See Barker 1968, pp. 154£ 
16 See Gibson 1986, p. 101. 
17 Gibson's own account of this relationship of tuning - in terms of information pick-up - need not 
detain us here. We are concerned, rather, with the ontological underpinnings of the ecological 
theories of Gibson and Barker, a detailed formal treatment of which is to be found in Smith and Varzi 
1999. 
18 Gibson 1986, p. 129. 
19 Compare the way in which each society is composed of families, communities, social classes, 
churches, political parties, and so on, in such a way that to each of these there corresponds in the life. 
of each of us different, cross-cutting zones of salience and motivation, different strands of 
physical-behavioral units in which we are engaged. See Kolnai 1981, p. 319. 
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The perceptions and actions of human beings are likewise tuned to the characteristic 
shapes and qualities and patterns of behavior of our own respective (mesoscopic) 
environments. This mutual embranglement is however in our case extended further via 
artefacts such as microscopes and telescopes, and via cultural phenomena such as 
languages and institutions of law and politics. To learn a language is in part to extend the 
range of objects in relation to which we are able spontaneously to adjust our behavior 
and thus it is to extend radically the types of niche or setting into which we can 
spontaneously fit. 
10 Transcategoriality of Physical-Behavioral Units 
In Book II of his Ideas Husserl utilizes ideas very much like these in order to provide an 
account not only of the environment of our everyday practical concerns but also of the 
special disciplinary environments of, for example, historians, natural scientists, and 
mathematicians. What he does not resolve in any adequate way is the issue of the 
interrelations between these various environments.2!2 He does not address, either, the 
various ways in which our environment of the moment may comprehend radically 
heterogeneous elements drawn from a variety of different domains. Physical-behavioral 
units are, we said, such as to transcend the boundaries between familiar ontological 
categories. Consider a physical-behavioral unit such as a religious meeting, a tennis 
championship or a sea battle. Each of these is an intricate complex of times, places, 
actions, and things. Its constituents can include both man-made elements (buildings, 
streets, cricket fields, books, pianos, libraries, the bridges and engine-rooms of 
battleships) and also natural features (hills, lakes, waves, particular climatic features, 
patterns of light and sound, the movements and gestures of other human . beings, 
pheromones). 
The physical-behavioral unit comprehends things and behavior, but it may, through these, 
comprehend also a variety of additional, non-physical components. Thus the unit may 
comprehend for example different types of linguistic, legal and institutional elements, all 
combined together in space and time in highly specific ways.21 Its constituent parts will 
in addition be diverse not only as concerns their material constitution but also as 
concerns their ontological form: thus each unit will comprehend continuants 
(substances), events, processes, actions, states and manifold relations between all of 
these. 
As Barker puts it: 
The conceptual incommensurability of phenomena which is such an obstacle to the 
unification of the sciences does not appear to trouble nature's units. - Within the larger 
units, things and events from conceptually more and more alien sciences are 
incorporated and regulated. (Barker 1968, p. 155) 
As far as our behavior is concerned, even the most radical diversity of kinds and 
20 See Smith I 995 for further details of this aspect of Husserl's theory of environments. 
21 Schoggen describes physical-behavioral settings as c~nsisting of 'highly structured, improbable 
arrangements of objects and events that coerce behavior in accordance with their own dynamic 
patterning.' (1989, p. 4) · 
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categories. need not prevent integration. Moreover, if perception and action are, as we 
have argued, dependent features of the total subject-environment relation, then the 
transcategoriality of environments will imply also a transcategoriality of perception and 
action, of a sort which will add yet further weight to the obstacles standing in the way of 
a science of perception and action of any standardly recognizable sort (and pose 
problems, too, for any simple version of the identity-theoretic account of the relation 
between mind and brain). 
11 Is Gibson a Realist? 
Because human environments are, as we saw, radically transcategorial, it follows that a 
science of human environments will look very different from any science of the more 
standard sort. This, too, might lead us to suppose· that environments, settings, 
physical~behavioral units are phenomena only - that they are subjective constructs, 
properly to be treated within the framework of a representationalist or methodologically 
solipsistic psychology. The challenge, as Gibson saw, is to develop a realist science of 
environmental settings which will be 'consistent With physics, mechanics, optics, 
acoustics, and chemistry' by taking seriously the idea that ecological facts are 'facts of 
higher order that have never been made explicit by these sciences and have gone 
unrecognized.' (Gibson 1979, p. 17) He uses the term 'ecology' precisely in order to 
designate the discipline that should encompass these higher-order facts; it is 'a blend of 
physics, geology, biology, archeology, and anthropology, but with an. attempt at 
unification' on the basis of the question: what can stimulate the organism? (Gibson 1966, 
p. 21) 
Gibson thus stands out from the bulk of contemporary psychologists in rejecting all 
varieties of representationalism in favor of a position he calls 'direct realism' according 
to which (once again:) we are, as a result of adaptation, bound up directly and 
spontaneouslyin our normal psychological experience with the objects themselves in the 
physical world. We ourselves form part of the physical environment. 
There is a puzzle, however. For Gibson's ecological perspective is in other respects 
however very close to the phenomenological theories of the life world referred to above, 
theories which have been held to dictate precisely a representationalist reading. Iri an 
important paper entitled "Is Gibson a Relativist?" Stuart Katz helps us to understand 
how this apparent conflict could have arisen by drawing-. attention to passages in 
Gibson's work which seem to negate the standard realist interpretation of his views and 
thus draw him closer to the phenomenologists. Katz points in particular to the following 
characteristic statements from Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: 
... animal and environment make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No 
animal could exist without an environment surrounding it. Equally, although not so 
obvious, an environment implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded. 
(1979, p. 8) 
The ajfordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
· furnishes, whether for good or ill. - I mean by [affordance] something that refers to both 
the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment. (1979, p. 127) · 
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.... an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if 
you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective. - It is both 
physical and psychical, yet neither (1979, p. 129). 
These passages dictate, according to Katz, a reading of Gibson according to which (as 
according to Uexkilll) different species live in different worlds. Water is for you and me 
a substance; for fish it is a medium which substances inhabit. Hence the question arises: 
Do terrestrial animals perceive water correctly and aquatic species incorrectly, or vice 
versa? Gibson aS relativist tells us no. Each lives in a different world and, 
complementarity, each perceives differently. Water is a substance in one wqrld and a 
medium in another; it is not absolutely substance, nor is it absolutely medium. 'The 
animal and its environment, remember, are reciprocal terms.' One could never say what 
water is, without saying for whom it is, and conversely. (Katz 1987, p. 120) 
12 Reasons for Representationalism 
Whether valid or not, Katz's argument is significant. If it is valid, then this implies that · 
Husserlians of an orthodox stripe can claim a hitherto unrecognized ally among 
experimental psychologists. If, on the other hand, the argument is flawed, then in 
coming to understand why this is. so, we will discover which modifications of standard 
Husserlian views must be made if we are to bring them into harmony with Gibsonian 
realism and thus to generate a position properly deserving the name 'Husserlian ecology'. 
To see which of these two alternatives is correct, we note that there are two principal 
motivations for representationalist views of perception: (1) the problem of error, and (2) 
the problem of seeming global incompatibilities between different systems of 
representations. 
The existence of perceptual error, according to familiar arguments (involving bent sticks 
and like phenomena), reveals that perception itself cannot be solely a product of sensory . 
inputs. It tells us that, O.Q. occasion at least, for example in cases of hallucination, 
perceptual objects are in some sense created or constituted by or with the help of the 
perceiver. A perceptual representationalist is one who holds that the objects that are 
given in perception are always constructed or constituted in this sense (hence they 
belong to a spe~ial world, a world of r~presentations ). The representationalist is thus 
able to do justice to the fact of perceptual error without abandoning the goal of a unified 
. theory of perception, but only at the price of cutting off his theory from any roots in the 
real world of mind-independent objects. The realist solution to the problem of error, on 
the other hand, denies that what is phenomenologically experienced as the unitary 
phenomenon of perception is in fact a tinitary matter at all. Rather, we must distinguish 
two types of perceptual setup, and correspondingly two distinct tasks for the theory of 
perception. On the one hand is the task of providing a theory of perception in the strict 
sense - a theory of successful, veridical, world-embrangled perception of the normal sort. 
On the other hand is the quite different task of giving an account of perceptual error (of 
the different types of shortfall from this standard, veridical case). 
The second motivation for representationalism might be formulated as follows: our 
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common-sense perceptual space has a Euclidean structure (or a structure closely related 
thereto); the space of the physicist .has another, quite different structure; and it may well 
be that the perceptual spaces of mice, of spiders, of clams, have other structures again. 
Not all of these structures can be true of space as it is in itself. Hence, the argument 
proceeds, ?ur, (and the mouse's, and the spider's) perceptual spaces are mere 
rep~esentat1ons . And what goes for space holds for other features of the manifold 
env1~onments of perception, too, so that, again, it is as if each species lives in its own 
special world. 
It 'is a constructivist, relativist,· projectivist, Kantianist conclusion of this sort which Katz· 
attributes to Gibso?. But, t~ remain .with Katz's own preferred example, space (as we 
may here. assume). •s a contmuum. Like all continua it can be partitioned in a range of ~utually mcompattble ways (as a .cheese can be sliced in such a way as to produce either 
tnangular or rect~gular or. disk-shaped segments but not all of these at once). All 
members of a famtly ~f mutually co?flicting 'perceptual spaces', now, may very well 
turn. ~ut to be compatible .a!ter all, 1f they can be interpreted as expressing distinct 
par~ztzons, f~r example part1t10ns on different levels of granularity, of one and the same re~h~. In this way the second motive for representationalism may be resisted, too, and w~th It also the argument put forward by Katz for a representationalist reading of 
Gibson. 
, 13 The Big Cheese 
Just as the. worl? of physica!.-~ehavioral units is for Barker organized hierarchically in ·' 
terms of c1rcumJacent and subJacent components, so for Gibson reality in general is a 
complex hierarchy of internested levels of parts and sub-parts. But neither Barker nor 
Gibson has at his disposal a theory of parts or components and of the wholes into which 
they are nested; neither has, in other words, a mereology, 21 in terms of which it would 
be possibl~ ~or th~m to foi:nmlate. an overarching account of the ways parts can fit 
together w1thm thetr respective environments and of how environments themselves can 
fit together in a larger, hierarchically organized order. It is for this reason I want to 
argue, that the ecological approach appears to fall victim to t4e argument of Katz. 
With th~ resour~es of a. gener~l mereology, however (of a sort sketched already by H~s~erl 1~ the third o~ his Logzcal Investigations), we are in a position to comprehend w1t~1? a smg.le th~o~et1cal framework what is involved when one, .and the same reality is 
part1t10n~d m. d1stt~ct, cross-cutting ways by organisms or cognitive subjects 
approachmg this reahty each from its own particular perspective. 
· Me~eology allows us to do justice to the ways in which, in the realm of environmental 
settmgs, entiti~s ?f radic~lly. different sorts are able to· become unified together into 
wholes: the umty m question 1s atleast in part a unity of psychological demarcation (it is analogou~, as w~ suggested above,. t.o the unity involved in the geopolitical realm, where 
ev~n spatially widely scattered entitles such as Indonesia or the United States are able to 
en Joy the status of unitary wholes even in the absence of any physical unification of their 
parts). 
22 See Smith 1996, 1999; Smith and Varzi 1999. 
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Mereology allows us finally to understand, in full conformity with the realist perspective, 
how different languages, different theories, and different systems of animal behavior and 
perception are able to generate their own precisely .~tting partit~on~ of one sin~le re~lity. 
The various animal behavior-systems generate partitions of reahty mto ecologzcal mches. 
Human perception and action together generate that mesoscopic partition of reality we 
call the common-sense world. And other sorts of partitioning of reality are generated, for 
example, by the acts of physicists, paleontologists, historians, and even mathe~~ti~ians. 
(The mathematician, we might say, is tuned to form.) Each such ~oup of ~1sc1plm~ 
specialists lives in its own precisely tailored disciplinary world, its precisely fittmg 
surrounding environment, exactly in the way described by Husserl in Ideas II. Now, 
however, we can understand how this multiplication of environments can be fully 
compatible with the realist ,perspective and with the hypothesis of a single, common 
world. The ultimate ontology will be scientific, but that itwill have room not only for 
physics but also for mesoscopic structures built up ?n the basis of physics,. e:g. st~ctures 
of the type to which human behaviour and perception are tuned. The reahsttc science of 
organisms, biology, needs as its counterpart a realistic science of environments. 
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